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GRASSROOTS ORIGINALISM: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
ARGUMENTS, THE ABORTION DEBATE, AND THE 
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY 
Mary Ziegler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
How has originalism become so politically successful?1 In answering 
this question, leading scholarship has focused on the ways in which 
political leaders, judges, and lawyers have cultivated popular support for 
originalism. In one account, legal academics, politicians, and judges have 
explained the legal merits of originalism as a method of interpretation: its 
political neutrality and its democratic legitimacy.2 In a second version, 
political leaders—in particular, the Reagan Administration and the judges it 
nominated—made apparent that originalism would often produce outcomes 
that social conservatives found satisfactory.3 With some exceptions, leading 
studies primarily address the contributions made by elites to rhetoric about 
and justifications for originalism, including those rationales based on 
judicial activism and judicial legitimacy.4  
                                                                                                                           
 
 ∗  I would like to thank Joel Goldstein, Roger Goldman, Anders Walker, and Eric Miller for their 
help with earlier drafts of this piece.     
 1  This Article focuses in particular on claims justifying originalism as democratically legitimate when 
other interpretive approaches are “activist.” For discussion of claims of this kind, see, for example, ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40 (1997); Thomas Colby, The New 
Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 777 (2011); Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009) (citing Rush Limbaugh’s view that “[t]he only antidote . . . to judicial activism is the 
conservative judicial philosophy known as Originalism”). 
 2  See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 137–38 (1996) 
(summarizing the view that originalism’s appeal lies in the failure of liberals to introduce a “principled 
alternative”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 
2–8 (1971) (“Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no 
principled way to prefer any claimed  human value to any other.”); Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of 
Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 779–95 (1987); Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic 
Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (“The appeal of 
originalism is that the moral principles so applied will be the foundational principles of the American 
Republic—principles we can all perceive for ourselves and that have shaped our nation’s political 
character—and not the political-moral principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial office.”).   
 3  See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 662 (2009); Stefanie A. Lindquist 
et al., The Rhetoric of Restraint and the Ideology of Activism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 103, 104–06 (2007) 
(offering empirical evidence that “restraintist” judges are guided by ideological commitments to 
federalism and to a strong Executive Branch); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political 
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545–46 (2006); Neil S. Siegel, 
Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555, 558–62 (2010).  
 4  See, e.g., supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that the term “grassroots,” used here 
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By focusing on arguments about the backlash against Roe v. Wade,5 this 
Article shows that an important justification for originalism—one based on 
the political consequences of “judicial activism”—emerged from 
interactions between activists, judges, and political leaders. However, these 
consequentialist contentions for originalism and against Roe emerged not in 
the academy or in the courts, but through dialogue between the elites, 
social-movement members, and the Grassroots Right.6 In 1980–1981, 
antiabortion advocates began arguing that Roe should be overruled because 
of the consequences of the Court’s activism: the creation of the antiabortion 
movement, the polarization of debate, and the effective preclusion of any 
meaningful legislative compromise.7   
As we shall see, these were not justifications for originalism as such but 
rather arguments against judicial activism and Roe. But as this Article will 
show, by the mid-1980s, Reagan Administration officials had seized on 
these consequence-based justifications and transformed them into 
arguments for originalism. Later, these contentions featured in the work of 
first-generation originalist scholars. As this Article shows, the politics of 
originalism have been conducted from the bottom up as well as from the top 
down. 
There is a good deal at stake in understanding the role of social-
movement activists and the Grassroots Right in creating consequence-based 
justifications for originalism. First, scholars sometimes adopt consequence-
based attacks on Roe as accurate descriptions of movement responses to the 
decision.8 As this Article shows, by contrast, claims about backlash to Roe 
                                                                                                                           
or in other scholarship, is inherently ambiguous: Are the leaders of major national movement organizations 
members of the elite, the grassroots, or both? Do physicians or attorneys working in movement organizations 
belong to the elite by virtue of their professional status? While acknowledging the complexity of these identity 
issues, this Article focuses on the interactions between social-movement members, including leaders and rank-
and-file activists, and the elites. 
 5  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 6  For examples of similar consequence-based claims made in the academy and the courts, see Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953–56 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 1000–01 (1992) (plurality decision) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 
497 U.S. 261, 300–01 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE 
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 159, 169, 193, 234 (1990); Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Review on the Basis of 
“Regime Principles”: A Prescription for Government by Judges, 26 S. TEX. L. REV. 435, 439–40 (1985). The 
term originalism first appeared in Paul Brest’s 1980 criticism of similar interpretive methods, making it unlikely 
that scholars would have defined themselves as originalists before the 1980s. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived 
Quest for Original Understanding, 80 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). On Brest’s coining the term, see Reva B. Siegel, 
Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1401 n.3 (2009). 
Nonetheless, this Article follows Richard Fallon and Reva Siegel in describing these scholars as first-generation 
originalists, distinguishable from a new generation of scholars discussed, among places, infra note 8 and 
accompanying text. On Fallon and Siegel’s use of “first generation” originalism, see, for example, Richard 
Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 13 (2011) and Siegel, supra at 1401. 
 7  See, e.g., BORK, supra note 6, at 159, 169, 193, 234; Graglia, supra note 6, at 439–40. 
 8  William Eskridge and John Ferejohn argue, for example, that, because of Roe, “Pro-life traditionalists 
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emerged from dialogue between New Right and antiabortion movement 
members and political leaders. We should be cautious about the historical 
validity of claims that have served so political a purpose.  
Second, by so often focusing on the academics, politicians, and judges 
who have popularized consequence-based justifications for originalism, we 
have not fully captured the distinctiveness or importance of popular, 
judicial activism-based justifications for originalism. Some movement 
claims may appear to echo first-generation originalist arguments that 
activist decisions are undemocratic or even illegitimate. On closer 
examination, as this Article contends, grassroots claims against judicial 
activism have a distinctive language, and their purpose and rhetoric differ 
considerably from the arguments articulated by politicians and professors. 
As we shall see, these claims drew on the kind of natural law thinking 
rejected by first-generation originalists, invoking religious and moral 
concerns as much as democratic ones. Scholars should be more attentive to 
the uses, meaning, and purpose of these grassroots and movement claims.  
For this reason, the materials assembled here suggest that the battle for 
the future of constitutional interpretation will not be won by whoever has 
the best theory. The politics of judicial philosophy have involved an 
unpredictable and highly contingent give-and-take between grassroots 
activists and the political and judicial elites. This will likely continue to be 
the case in the future. 
My argument proceeds in three segments. Part II.A briefly sets out 
leading scholarship on the politics of originalism. Part II.B challenges 
current accounts by closely examining how a consequence-based 
justification for overruling Roe evolved in the 1980s. Drawing on the 
history, Part II.C examines the implications of this history for current 
studies of originalism. Part III briefly concludes. 
                                                                                                                           
mobilized as a normative social movement seeking to preserve not only human life but also a traditionalist ethic 
of family values and women’s domestic role. They criticized Roe v. Wade because it took the most moral of 
issues away from family and state decision making, represented arrogant judicial legislation, and marginalized 
the interests of the fetus . . . .” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE 
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 242 (2010). Cass Sunstein agrees that Roe “probably contributed to the creation 
of the ‘moral majority’; helped defeat the Equal Rights Amendment; prevented the eventual achievement of 
consensual solutions to the abortion problem; and severely undermined the women’s movement, by defining that 
movement in terms of the single issue of abortion, by spurring and organizing opposition, and by demobilizing 
potential adherents.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 147 (1993); see also Michael J. Klarman, 
Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of Constitutional Evil, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1739, 1751 (1997) 
(describing the “conventional understanding of Roe v. Wade” as the notion that “far from reconciling abortion 
opponents to a woman’s fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, the decision actually spawned a right-to-
life opposition which did not previously exist”). 




A. From the Top to the Right: Conventional Accounts of Political 
Originalism 
The political appeal of originalism is at the center of at least three 
important scholarly debates. Of course, as Reva Siegel has written, “There 
is not one theory of originalism, but many.”9 My purpose here is not to 
argue for or against any kind of originalism or for or against originalism 
writ large. Instead, my focus is on why the public, and the Grassroots Right 
in particular, has been so receptive to a stylized, oversimplified version of 
originalism: Originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation that 
emphasizes text, history, and authorial intent and rejects the idea of a 
“living Constitution” that changes over time.   
One body of scholarship on this question addresses the operation and 
appeal of originalism. Antonin Scalia, Michael McConnell, and other 
defenders of either first- or second-generation originalism assert that the 
appeal of the philosophy is primarily legal, and legitimacy-based claims for 
originalism are appealing in principle.10 For these scholars, ordinary citizens 
are attracted to originalism and its anti-activism justifications because it is 
the only democratically legitimate and politically neutral interpretive 
method.11 McConnell explains that originalism, and legitimacy-based 
arguments for it, are seductive, because originalism “supplies an objective 
basis for judgment that does not merely reflect the judge’s own ideological 
stance.”12 Scalia has described the attraction of originalism and the anti-
judicial activism arguments supporting it by drawing attention to the flaws 
of its alternatives, which, in his words, focus on what the Constitution 
“ought to mean.”13  
The suggestion in this scholarship is that originalism and concerns 
about judicial activism enjoy popular support because it is the most 
principled alternative available. In 1992, in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Scalia further suggested that, in the 
                                                                                                                           
 
 9  Siegel, supra note 6, at 1403. For a recent account of the different brands of originalism, see 
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 10  See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 11  See, e.g., KALMAN, supra note 2, at 137–38. 
 12  See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and 
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2415 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 
(2005)). 
 13  Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 3, 39 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
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abortion context, the public has expected and even demanded that the Court 
adhere to originalism.14 By contrast, if the Court claimed that “the ‘liberties’ 
protected by the Constitution are . . . undefined and unbounded,” then the 
people would and should rise up.15 As Scalia framed it, popular demand for 
originalism and popular hostility toward judicial activism simply reflect an 
interest in democracy and apolitical judging. 
For some time, scholars have questioned the legal merits of 
originalism.16 But as Jamal Greene has observed, the academic attacks on 
originalism do not appear to have made a dent in its popularity in the courts 
or with the general public.17 This phenomenon has led those skeptical of 
originalism to seek alternative explanations of its appeal. In a 2006 
Fordham Law Review article, Robert Post and Reva Siegel argued that 
“[t]he current ascendancy of originalism does not reflect the analytic force 
of its jurisprudence, but instead depends upon its capacity to fuse aroused 
citizens, government officials, and judges into a dynamic and broad-based 
political movement.”18 In the context of gun rights, for example, Siegel has 
shown that justifications for originalism emerged from a give-and-take 
between social-movement organizations, political leaders, and the courts.19 
Following Post and Siegel, two bodies of scholarship have questioned 
what it means to describe originalism as a political practice. One body of 
work has presented and analyzed originalism and the judicial-activism 
arguments for it as a form of popular constitutionalism.20 Much of this 
scholarship identifies one of two sources of this popular engagement. One 
body of work describes the role of the Reagan Administration in 
                                                                                                                           
 
 14  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting in 
part). 
 15  Id. at 1001. 
 16  See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 911, 950–51 (1988) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)); 
Berman, supra note 9, at 5–6 (distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” originalism); Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 216–18 (1980); Thomas B. 
Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244–45 (2009) (arguing that originalists’ 
work consists of a “smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories” that are “rapidly evolving”).  
 17  See Greene, supra note 3, at 659–60; Ideological Chasm over Interpreting Constitution, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. PUBL’NS (June 20, 2011), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2029/poll-supreme-court-
intrepret-constitution-originalism.  
 18  Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 549. 
 19  See generally Greene, supra note 1, at 6 (“American originalism is an instrument through which a 
domestic, sociopolitical movement seeks to validate its political commitments and to influence our courts.”); 
Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 
215–16 (2008); Siegel, supra note 6, at 1401 n.3. 
 20  See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Judical Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
2047, 2047 (2010); Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 701, 703 (2007); Siegel, supra note 19, at 192. 
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popularizing originalism.21 In particular, Post and Siegel have highlighted 
the role of former Attorney General Edwin Meese in drawing citizen 
attention to the issue of judicial philosophy.22  
Reagan’s judicial nominees are also thought to have publicized 
originalist claims and anti-judicial activism claims for it.23 For example, in 
studying the conservative groundswell that greeted the Court’s decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas, Siegel claims that Scalia defended originalism and 
warned grassroots conservatives “that if they did not mobilize to protest the 
Court’s decision in Lawrence, then the Lawrence opinion would soon be 
read to authorize gay marriage.”24 Other scholars have broadened this 
contention, focusing on the role of Republican politicians or judicial 
nominees in spreading popular arguments for originalism.25  
Using originalism as an example, a related body of scholarship seeks to 
identify what makes any judicial philosophy a political success.26 This work 
has both descriptive and prescriptive dimensions: it helps to explain the 
current prominence of originalism and judicial-activism talk and identifies 
ways in which a truly competitive alternative might be developed.27 
Threaded through each of these debates, as we have seen, are important 
claims about the ways in which elites have popularized various arguments 
for a jurisprudence of original intent. These leaders may be scholars and 
judges highlighting the legal strengths of originalism, or they may be 
political figures hinting at the outcomes that philosophy will produce.  
Scholars like Greene and Siegel acknowledge that the political appeal 
of originalism arises through interactions between the grassroots and the 
elites.28 Nonetheless, current scholarship primarily analyzes the role played 
by the elites in popularizing originalism.29 In the case of Roe, important 
legitimacy-based arguments for originalism were not spread by experts to 
lay audiences but rather were created in a discussion between activists, 
professors, and politicians.30 The dialogue that helped to produce these 
arguments was complicated and fluid. It is important to stress that 
popularizing a particular theory of constitutional interpretation has not been 
                                                                                                                           
 
 21  See, e.g., Greene, supra note 3, at 659–60; Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 550–61.  
 22  See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 550–51. 
 23  See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto Era, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1347 (2006). 
 24  Id. at 1346. 
 25  See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 3, at 558–62. 
 26  See, e.g., Greene, supra note 3, at 660–61. 
 27  Id. 
 28  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 29  See, e.g., supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text. 
 30  See infra Part II.B.  
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and likely will not be a matter of simply persuading ordinary citizens. The 
process will be dynamic, unpredictable, and interactive.  
Second, the history considered here suggests that too little is known 
about the vocabulary, aims, and strategies of grassroots opponents of 
judicial activism. By focusing on elite efforts to cultivate support for 
originalism, current studies have assumed that grassroots activists make the 
same kinds of claims about originalism as do the political leaders or 
academics who explain it to them. In truth, in the abortion debate, lay 
advocates critical of progressive activist judging have contentions and aims 
of their own.   
How did the Grassroots Right participate in the creation of arguments 
for originalism? Part II.B turns next to this question. 
B. Why to Overrule Roe, 1981–1990 
As we shall see, the popularization of originalism, or something like it, 
began with politicians and academics.31 In the political context, during the 
1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon promoted “strict 
constructionism,” whereby courts apply only the meaning of a legal text as 
it was written.32 During Nixon’s two terms in office, there was some public 
interest in what “strict constructionism” meant.33 In announcing the January 
1970 nomination of southern judge G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme 
Court, Nixon promised to seek judges who would “interpret” but not 
“make” law.34 He elaborated further on the meaning of strict 
constructionism during the successful nomination of William Rehnquist. 
Then, Nixon asserted that the alternative to a strict constructionist judge 
was one who would “twist or bend the Constitution in order to perpetuate 
his personal political and social views.”35 During his hearings, Rehnquist 
echoed Nixon’s arguments and further explained that “constructionist” 
judges would rely exclusively on the “language used by the framers [of the 
                                                                                                                           
 
 31  See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 3. 
 32  For analysis of Nixon’s “strict constructionism,” see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE 
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 280–83 (2009); Keith E. Whittington, William H. Rehnquist: Nixon’s Strict 
Constructionist, Reagan’s Chief Justice, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT 
DYNAMIC 8, 9–27 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003); S. Sidney Ulmer, Supreme Court Justices as Strict and 
Not-So-Strict Constructionists: Some Implications, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 13, 13 (1973). 
 33  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 282–83. 
 34  Carswell Seen as Perfect “Strict Constructionist,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1970, at 44, available at 
1970 WLNR 54396. 
 35  Address to the Nation Announcing Intention to Nominate Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. 
Rehnquist To Be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 337 PUB. PAPERS 1054 
(Oct. 21, 1971). 
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Constitution], the historical materials available, and the precedents which 
other Justices of the Supreme Court have decided in cases involving a 
particular provision.”36  
The failed Carswell nomination and the direction taken by the Burger 
Court diminished interest in strict constructionism and in judicial 
philosophy more generally.37 The month Nixon announced Carswell’s 
nomination, leaders of the civil rights movement went on the attack. Former 
NAACP legal advisor L. D. Clark informed the New York Times that “strict 
constructionism” was “open[ly] [and] blatant[ly] segregationist.”38 During 
Carswell’s hearings, NAACP advocates revealed that, in 1948, the judge 
had made a speech extolling the virtues of white supremacy.39 Nixon’s 
proposed philosophy had become inextricably linked with the politics of 
race. 
What was more, once on the Court, Nixon’s nominees appeared to be 
more similar to the justices who had come before them than Nixon might 
have wanted. A series of sweeping decisions penned or joined by Nixon 
nominees, including Roe, appeared as far-reaching as anything issued by the 
Warren Court.40 Whatever Nixon had been talking about, the Supreme 
Court seemed to be doing something else entirely.  
The most developed discussion of judicial activism had emerged 
several decades earlier in the legal academy. Writing in 1959, in framing his 
now-famous criticism of Brown v. Board of Education,41 Herbert Wechsler 
presented an argument against judicial activism, contending that “[t]he man 
who simply lets his judgment turn on the immediate result may not, 
however, realize that his position implies that the courts are free to function 
as a naked power organ, that it is an empty affirmation to regard them . . . as 
courts of law.”42 After the early 1950s, members of the legal process 
movement—a school of scholars who praised decisions based on the plain 
meaning of a text, on constitutional design and institutional competence, or 
                                                                                                                           
 
 36  Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 55 (1971) (statement of William H. Rehnquist). 
 37  See generally James B. O’Hara, Introduction to THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR 
CONFIRMATION? 3, 4 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1998); G. Harrold Carswell; Rejected for U.S. High Court, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 1, 1992, available at 1992 WLNR 4034548.  
 38  See Carswell Seen as Perfect “Strict Constructionist,” supra note 34. 
 39  Nixon Says He Did Not Know of Judge Carswell’s ’48 Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1970, at 15, 
available at 1970 WLNR 56553. 
 40  For examples of the scholarship on the relationship between the Burger and Warren Courts, see 
generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) 
and THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION?, supra note 37, at 3–8. 
 41  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 42  Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 
(1959). 
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on the presumed neutrality of procedural or process-based solutions—also 
stressed claims against judicial activism.43 
In the 1970s, first-generation originalist scholars took up similar 
criticisms. In 1971, in setting out a jurisprudence of original intent, Yale 
law professor Robert Bork revived attacks on judicial activism, focusing on 
claims that judicial overreaching was unprincipled and illegitimate.44 As 
Bork argued, the marital privacy right described in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
the Court’s first substantive due process case in the modern era, was 
unprincipled, since the judge in such a case would have “no basis other than 
his own values upon which to set aside the community judgment embodied 
in the statute.”45 The only way to avoid this kind of overreaching, Bork 
went on, was to “stick close to the text and the history [of the    
Constitution] . . . and not construct new rights.”46 Other originalist scholars 
highlighted arguments against judicial activism. In several books attacking 
the Supreme Court’s decisions on school integration, Lino Graglia 
criticized “judicial policymaking.”47 In 1977, Raoul Berger published a 
book-length defense of originalism, condemning as undemocratic the 
activist decisions of the Warren Court.48 In 1976, then-Associate Justice 
William Rehnquist offered similar arguments in favor of a “dead 
Constitution.”49 
During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan and the 
members of his staff began to popularize arguments against judicial 
activism.50 As we shall see, however, these claims were less forceful and 
less developed than the ones that would appear in the decades to come. In 
particular, in the early years, Reagan and his allies did not defend 
                                                                                                                           
 
 43  See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 51–59 (1962) (criticizing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), as 
unprincipled); Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: “Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and 
Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 162–67 (1964). On the legal process 
school, see Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century’s 
End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 25–31 (1999).  
 44  See Bork, supra note 2, at 4. For other examples of first-generation originalist criticism of 
activist judging in the 1970s, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. 
REV. 693, 699 (1976) (arguing that any outcome advanced by a “freewheeling, non-elected judiciary is 
quite unacceptable in a democratic society”) and RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 389–401 (2d ed. 1997).   
 45  See Bork, supra note 2, at 10. For the decision in Griswold, see 381 U.S. 479, 482–86 (1965). 
 46  See Bork, supra note 2, at 8. 
 47  See, e.g., LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE 
AND THE SCHOOLS passim (1976). 
 48  See generally BERGER, supra note 44. 
 49  See Rehnquist, supra note 44, at 693, 699. 
 50  See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 550–61. 
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originalism as much as they attacked what they described as judicial 
activism.51 
Some of Reagan’s natural allies were avowed opponents of legal 
abortion. Indeed, while he served as Governor of California and made an 
unsuccessful 1976 presidential run, Reagan had made himself into the 
favored candidate of the emerging New Right.52 “As they described it, 
leaders of the New Right rose from the ashes of the Watergate scandal: the 
result of ‘impatience with the shambles of the Nixon-Ford 
Administration.’”53 One of the orchestrators of this movement was Paul 
Weyrich, a co-founder of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-
tank, and a co-founder of the Committee for the Survival of a Free 
Congress (“CSFC”), a group dedicated to electing social conservatives to 
Congress.54 Weyrich saw his mission as the creation of a grassroots, 
politically pragmatic Right, a complement to the intellectuals who had 
dominated conservatism.55 He explained to the press in November 1977: 
“Conservatives have been led by an intellectual movement but not a 
practical movement until now . . . . We [now] talk about issues people care 
about, like gun control, abortion, taxes, and crime.”56 Weyrich’s 
organizations provided valuable training and money to fledgling New Right 
causes: by 1978, the CSFC and other conservative political action 
committees, including the National Conservative Political Action 
Committee (“NCPAC”), had raised more than $3 million for conservative 
candidates.57 
While Weyrich provided political strategy for these groups, Richard 
Viguerie and his direct-mail organization offered lobbying and fundraising 
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services.58 In 1980, Viguerie raised between $35 and $40 million for his 
clients.59  
Allied with Weyrich and Viguerie was the newly powerful Religious 
Right.60 Although the Religious Right of the 1970s is primarily associated 
with evangelical Protestantism, the movement attracted conservative 
Catholics, Mormons, and Jews.61 The Religious Right also unified a variety 
of Protestant groups that had previously disagreed on issues ranging from 
abortion to the civil rights movement.62 New socially conservative 
organizations included the fundamentalist Baptists like those to whom Jerry 
Falwell preached, Pentecostals like those loyal to Pat Robertson, and both 
northern and southern Baptists.63 Historians point to a number of long- and 
short-term trends that contributed to the rise of this form of social 
conservatism: for example, the fragmentation of the civil rights movement 
of the 1950s and 1960s, the rapid demographic growth of populations 
naturally attracted to evangelical Christianity, and the migration of a 
significant number of Americans to states in the Sunbelt.64  
Members of the Religious Right themselves claimed to have been 
inspired by important cultural, social, and economic changes  of the 1960s 
and 1970s. A list offered in the promotional materials put out in 1980 by 
one organization, the Moral Majority, may be representative: the Supreme 
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Court had banned school prayer and had legalized abortion, the women’s 
movement had won influential allies in criticizing some aspects of the 
traditional family, and gays and lesbians had become more visible and more 
vocal in demanding equal treatment.65 Between 1956 and 1977, the spread 
of Christian television broadcasting reinforced concern about these social 
changes: among others, Pat Robertson founded the Christian Broadcasting 
Network (“CBN”) in 1970, and Jerry Falwell began broadcasting The Old 
Time Gospel Hour in 1956.66  
Falwell’s Moral Majority seemed be part of an important religious and 
cultural shift. By 1976, both Time and Newsweek reported on polling data 
from the American Institute of Public Opinion that led George Gallup Jr. to 
proclaim 1976 as the “Year of the Evangelicals.”67 In a 1976 Gallup Poll, 
34% of respondents claimed to have had a born-again religious experience, 
and nearly half of all Protestants polled agreed that the Bible “is to be taken 
literally.”68  
By the mid- to late 1970s, as this Article will show, the Religious Right 
had become a political force—a grassroots movement with a highly 
structured and professional leadership. One influential group, Christian 
Voice, was founded in 1978 as part of the Heritage Foundation.69 By 1979, 
the organization had 100,000 members and a governing board that included 
fourteen members of Congress.70 The Moral Majority, another Religious 
Right organization, had a $3 million budget in its first year, one-third of 
which was raised in one month alone.71 Described by Falwell as a “coalition 
capable of steering America away from liberal, humanist and secular 
tendencies,” the Moral Majority was also quickly establishing its political 
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influence.72 By December 1979, Falwell was reaching an audience of 2.5 
million and was raising $1 million a week in mail contributions.73  
Founded in 1979 by former Colgate Palmolive salesman Ed McAteer, a 
third organization, the Religious Roundtable, was focused on encouraging 
conservative Christians to become politically involved.74 The group came to 
include many of the best-known televangelists, including Falwell and 
Robertson.75 During the Reagan Administration, when Christian 
conservatives angrily protested the nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor to 
the Court, Ronald Reagan’s White House was obliged to assuage the 
concerns of Roundtable members, both in private sessions and in the 
media.76  
During Reagan’s presidential campaign, to an unprecedented extent, the 
antiabortion movement allied itself with both the New Right and the 
Religious Right. For example, having failed for several years to secure a 
vote against the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”), in 1977, the National 
Right to Life Committee (“NRLC”), the nation’s largest antiabortion group, 
finally passed a resolution condemning the Amendment.77 The same year, 
those at the helm of major antiabortion organizations like the NRLC and 
March for Life appeared at a “pro-family” event led by Phyllis Schlafly, 
and the leaders of these groups joined in condemning not only abortion but 
also the ERA and publicly funded daycare.78   
Between 1977 and 1980, a number of self-identified evangelical 
Protestant antiabortion groups became prominent, including the influential 
Christian Action Council (“CAC”).79 At the same time, mainstream groups 
like the NRLC begin stressing openly religious arguments against 
abortion.80 In the early 1970s, mainstream antiabortion leaders routinely 
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insisted that their movement had nothing to do with religion. For example, 
in 1974, the NRLC vigorously objected to claims that “the rationale for 
abortion laws is related only to the religious convictions of individual 
citizens, and to the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church in particular.”81 
By contrast, by October 1977, the NRLC had passed a resolution describing 
the organization as a religious (although not exclusively Catholic) 
organization, asserting that the “Right to Life Movement is founded upon 
the belief that God creates LIFE.”82 Other groups founded in the late 1970s, 
like Judie Brown’s American Life League (“ALL”), openly proclaimed a 
Catholic pro-life message.83  
At the same time, however, the leaders of the mainstream movement 
committed to a new pragmatism. As Keith Cassidy has documented, in the 
immediate aftermath of Roe, the movement focused primarily on passing a 
human life amendment that would have recognized rights to life from 
conception to natural death.84 The appeal of an amendment was twofold. 
First, such a measure would have banned many more abortions than even 
the restrictions in place in many states before Roe.85 Almost as importantly, 
as movement members saw it, an amendment would symbolize and 
communicate the movement’s ideological commitments and refusal to 
compromise. In 1973, for example, Joseph Witherspoon, an antiabortion 
activist and professor at the University of Texas School of Law, argued that 
an amendment was necessary not only to ban abortion but also to “assert[] a 
great moral and legal truth.”86 Indeed, the movement almost uniformly 
opposed amendments that would have overturned Roe and returned the 
abortion issue to the states.87 Activists described these measures as 
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compromises that would permit states like New York to legalize abortion.88 
As Fordham law professor and antiabortion activist Robert Byrn explained 
in 1973: “[W]e are a right to life movement. I rather doubt that our people 
will come out in vast numbers to support an amendment which by inference 
says that unborn children have no right to life.”89 
By contrast, in the early 1980s, those who came to lead groups like the 
NRLC were more willing to compromise, especially in the context of a 
human life amendment to the Constitution. This became apparent after late 
September 1981, when Utah Senator Orrin Hatch proposed a federalism 
amendment that would return regulation of abortion to the states.90 
Although the measure was proposed as a practical middle-ground solution, 
mainstream antiabortion groups came out in favor of it. After a bitter 
debate, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops endorsed the proposal 
in November 1981.91 Archbishop John Roach of Minneapolis, the President 
of the Conference, implied that the Bishops had endorsed a states’ rights 
amendment primarily because it was seen to be more politically feasible.92  
Similarly, in mid-December, a divided NRLC voted to endorse the 
Hatch amendment.93 Indeed, Dr. John Willke, a leader of the organization, 
described it as part of a long-term, incremental strategy to chip away at 
Roe.94 For the Reagan campaign, the movement mainstream had become an 
interesting and complicated potential partner. At the same time that the 
movement had become more socially conservative and even religious in its 
rhetoric, antiabortion leaders had made apparent a willingness to put 
                                                                                                                           
note 77 (explaining that the “‘states’ rights’ type of amendment” was “largely ignored by Movement 
leaders”). 
 88  See id. at 2–3 (summarizing the views of William Ball, an attorney for the United States Catholic 
Conference, that a states’ rights amendment would “permit a state such as New York to have a statute 
which is very permissive with respect to abortion”). 
 89  See Memorandum from Professor Robert M. Byrn to Edward J. Golden, Chairman, N.Y. State 
Right to Life Comm. 1–3 (Feb. 1973), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, supra note 
77. 
 90  Washington Talk: The Calendar (Monday), N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1981, at B10. 
 91  Kenneth A. Briggs, Bishops Support Plan by Hatch to Curb Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
1981, at A19; Kenneth A. Briggs, The Bishops Take a Risk: New ‘Peace’ Positions Sure to Ignite 
Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1981, at B10 [hereinafter Bishops Take a Risk]. 
 92  See, e.g., Bishops Take a Risk, supra note 91; Steven V. Roberts, Catholic Bishops for 
Amendment Allowing States to Ban Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1981, at A1. 
 93  Anti-Abortion Group Backs Hatch Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1981, at 39. 
 94  There was disagreement within the movement about the desirability of incrementalism. For 
example, the American Life League, an anti-contraception, antiabortion organization, went further, 
labeling the proposal a “betray[al of the movement’s] supporters, as well as babies.” Beware of False 
Friends!, A.L.L. ABOUT ISSUES (Am. Life League), Oct. 1981, in The Wilcox Collection (on file with 
the University of Kansas); Down The Hatch!, A.L.L. ABOUT ISSUES (Am. Life League), Jan. 1982, in 
The Wilcox Collection, supra.  
216 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:201 
 
political success and strategic savvy before the abstract principles the 
movement espoused.  
The summer 1980 platform announced at the Republican National 
Convention was designed in part to attract these antiabortion leaders, as 
well as their allies in the New Right.95 At first, the Reagan campaign 
avoided the kinds of arguments made against judicial activism in the courts 
or in the academy, instead stressing the kind of natural-law proposal many 
first-generation originalists had found objectionable.96 In particular, the 
platform proposed “the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary 
who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human 
life.”97 The judicial selection plank immediately won praise from social 
conservatives. Jerry Falwell stated that the platform could hardly have been 
better if leaders of the Religious Right had written it themselves.98  
By October 1980, the judicial selection plank had drawn criticism from 
lawyers in both political parties, as well as from the American Bar 
Association House of Delegates, which had voted to oppose Reagan’s 
proposal to select judges “on the basis of particular ideological or political 
philosophies.”99 Initially, Reagan defended the platform, arguing: “We all 
ought to have a compassion for innocent human life.”100 Over time, 
however, the Reagan campaign revised its judicial selection proposal, 
balancing the interests of social conservatives and antiabortion leaders on 
the one hand and lawyers who advocated impartiality on the other.101 
Leading this effort was Reagan advisor William French Smith.102 In 
November 1980, he worked to characterize Reagan’s interest in antiabortion 
judges as a desire to select only those judges who rejected what Smith saw 
as the judicial activism of the Warren and Burger Courts.103 Smith did not 
make clear how Reagan thought judges should interpret the Constitution, 
but he drew on some of the attacks made on unprincipled judging by critics 
like Rehnquist and Bork. He explained: “In a nutshell, [Reagan’s] political 
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philosophy is the laws of the country should be made by the legislature and 
construed by the judiciary, and, to the extent possible, not made by the 
judiciary.”104 
Given Reagan’s prior commitment to pro-life judges and his need to 
address legal critics, abortion opponents could easily have understood 
Smith’s statements as code for opposition to abortion. At the same time, 
though, Smith’s language was vague enough to appease abortion rights 
supporters, especially after October 1980, when Reagan responded to 
feminist demands that a woman be nominated to the Supreme Court.105  
In either case, with the support of grassroots conservatives, Reagan and 
the Republican Party were spectacularly successful in 1980. Reagan handily 
beat incumbent Jimmy Carter, carrying forty-four of fifty states.106 For the 
first time in twenty-five years, Republicans retook the Senate.107 It seemed 
likely that a Reagan nominee could successfully navigate the Senate on his 
or her way to the Supreme Court. The remaining question was what kind of 
judges Reagan would appoint. 
1. The O’Connor Dispute, 1981 
Antiabortion activists believed that they had the answer to this question 
in early July 1981, when Reagan announced the nomination of Sandra Day 
O’Connor to the Supreme Court.108 In her time as an Arizona legislator, 
O’Connor had several opportunities to weigh in on policy questions 
involving sex and reproduction. In the early 1970s, she had signed a 
statement calling for population control in the United States that had been 
drafted by Dick Lamm, the leader of an effort to reform Colorado’s 
abortion ban.109 O’Connor had also been an acquaintance of Dr. Carolyn 
Gerster, a recent president of the NRLC, the nation’s largest antiabortion 
group.110 After the nomination was announced, Gerster immediately 
informed the rest of the antiabortion community that, during her time in the 
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Arizona State Legislature, O’Connor had supported the Equal Rights 
Amendment and had voted in favor of an abortion liberalization bill.111   
Members of the antiabortion movement were outraged by the 
nomination. Representative Henry Hyde informed Edwin Meese III, a 
longtime Reagan advisor and then-Counselor to the President, that he would 
oppose the selection.112 Dr. John Willke, then-President of the NRLC, 
threatened to attack O’Connor in the press if her nomination were not 
withdrawn.113 Harold O. J. Brown, the head of the Christian Action 
Council, an evangelical Protestant antiabortion group, wrote Meese that the 
nomination would have a “disastrous effect . . . on the enthusiasm of the 
evangelical community for President Reagan.”114  
Publicly, before the confirmation hearings began, the Reagan 
Administration paid little attention to the antiabortion attacks. In August 
1981, Reagan himself described Carolyn Gerster as “vindictive.”115 An 
anonymous aide told the New York Times: “[T]here’s going to be a lot of 
sound and fury, but in the end, it’s going to end up signifying little or 
nothing . . . .”116 Less publicly, however, as we shall see, Edwin Meese 
argued to Reagan and the rest of the Administration that more had to be 
done to convince both the movement and the general public of the problems 
with judicial activism.  
During Reagan’s first term, Meese had become an unofficial go-
between for social conservatives, and the O’Connor nomination proved to 
be no exception. In a memorandum to Meese, one of his aides claimed that 
antiabortion advocates believed that the courts had “been engaged in a 
systematic effort to prevent the public from working its will on the subject 
of abortion.”117 In fact, movement members had never emphasized such an 
argument—the White House, not activists, had stressed the subject of 
judicial overreaching.118  
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The memorandum continued: “Whatever one may think of that 
argument, or of the merits of abortion itself, the intensity of right-to-lifers 
on the issue of judicial power should not be underestimated.”119 The 
memorandum proposed a nomination strategy that would cater to 
antiabortion advocates without appearing to be partisan: “It does not follow 
that a pro-lifer must be nominated. It does follow, I think, that the 
nominee’s record on the issue be examined with special scrutiny and that 
the nominee regard Roe v. Wade and its progeny as most unwise assertions 
of judicial power.”120 Although several years would pass before the Reagan 
Administration would be in a position to implement the ideas set forth in 
the memorandum, the basic outline of a strategy was in place. The 
antiabortion movement could be won over not by criticizing legal abortion 
but rather by condemning the Roe Court’s activism. Nonetheless, the 
Grassroots Right would play a more complex role than might have been 
predicted, creating as well as responding to claims about judicial activism. 
2. Reworking the Argument 
During the O’Connor confirmation hearings, leaders of the NRLC and 
other antiabortion groups challenged the connection between rejecting 
judicial activism and banning abortion. In congressional testimony, Father 
Charles Fiore, a member of the National Pro-Life Action Committee, the 
nation’s largest direct-action protest antiabortion organization, rejected the 
idea of judicial restraint and demanded open hostility to Roe.121 As he 
explained: “I find [O’Connor’s] philosophy as exemplified in her record as 
a legislator and leader in the State Senate of Arizona [to be] clearly 
proabortion, and so on the basis of criteria set forth by the platform of the 
majority party in the Senate . . . she would appear to be unqualified.”122 A 
beleaguered Carolyn Gerster also expressed doubt about Reagan’s promise 
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to select “strict constructionists,” accusing the Administration of 
“misrepresentation, evasion, and distortion of fact . . . .”123 
Other advocates opposed to O’Connor, however, offered novel claims 
about the justifications for rejecting judicial activism. For example, Gordon 
Jones of United Families for America, a socially conservative grassroots 
lobbying group, explained that O’Connor’s supposed approval of Roe 
proved her judicial philosophy to be irrevocably flawed.124 As he asserted: 
“[T]he issue is not abortion but judicial activism. Roe v. Wade happens to 
be the worst example of judicial activism in this century . . . .”125 He even 
addressed the Supreme Court, suggesting that the justices should be 
concerned about the “seriousness of the loss of faith experienced by the 
federal courts in recent years.”126  
In his congressional testimony, Dr. John Willke elaborated further on 
this argument. As Willke stated, “The Supreme Court’s 1973 abortion 
decision had no authentic basis in the Constitution. Rather, they constituted 
the most extreme examples of ‘judicial activism’ . . . in this century . . . .”127 
He contended that O’Connor was, by definition, an activist if she regarded 
“the 1973 abortion decisions as constitutional . . . .”128  
Willke also developed a set of social and political justifications for 
undoing Roe. He first argued: “We exist as a movement because of . . .  Roe 
. . . .”129 Although he himself had been involved in antiabortion activism 
before Roe was decided,130 he asserted that Roe had created and sustained a 
movement against abortion.131 Next, he claimed that Roe had destroyed any 
possibility of political compromise: “[W]e live in a Nation that is totally 
polarized on this issue. Unlike other issues in the body politic, there is no 
midground, there is no compromise. A baby is either a baby or not . . . .” 132 
Willke played on public anxiety about the emotion and intensity of the 
abortion debate. As he framed it, the best way to produce a cooler, more 
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rational debate was to overrule Roe. Willke was not yet making an 
argument for originalism as such. Instead, his consequence-based claim was 
made primarily against Roe and what he understood to be judicial activism. 
Significantly, first-generation originalist scholars or other members of 
the elite had not yet used such consequence-based arguments, either in 
criticizing Roe or in defending originalism. The dominant defense instead 
was a theoretical one: originalism was portrayed as the only principled, 
law-like philosophy and the only one consistent with democratic principles. 
Bork had suggested that judicial activism was illegitimate regardless of its 
consequences, although admitting that the public might no longer support 
judicial review if a judge made “explicit the imposition of his own          
will . . . .”133  
Raoul Berger and William Rehnquist specifically addressed the 
consequences of judicial activism. Berger presented the Court’s usurpation 
of self-government as the only relevant “consequence” of judicial 
activism.134 No decision, even Brown v. Board of Education, was enough to 
offset “countenancing undeniable judicial arrogations of power . . . .”135 
Moreover, Berger did not offer the effects of judicial activism as a stand-
alone argument for originalism. Instead, he brought up the issue only in 
response to those who had argued for living constitutionalism by pointing to 
its beneficial results  (and in particular to the decision in Brown).136  
Rehnquist went one step further, looking at historical examples of 
activist decision-making.137 If living constitutionalism had given the public 
Brown, as Rehnquist reasoned, it had also led to the Court’s decision in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, a notoriously racist decision striking down the 
Missouri Compromise on slavery.138 Rehnquist did offer some explanation 
as to why the Dred Scott Court’s activism was so disastrous, highlighting 
the “injury [it caused] to the reputation of the Supreme Court . . . .”139 Just 
the same, Rehnquist did not yet offer the negative consequences of activist 
decision-making as an affirmative justification for his own philosophy.140   
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Of course, Willke was offering only arguments against judicial 
activism, not justifications for originalism as such. Just the same, his 
arguments made an important contribution to conversation about judicial 
legitimacy and judicial activism. He pointed to social and political 
consequences that followed from activism instead of merely asserting that it 
was undemocratic. He also suggested that the consequences of activism 
were one of the main reasons for forswearing it. Why avoid judicial 
overreaching? As Willke framed it, to answer this question, one needed 
only look at the aftermath of Roe v. Wade. 
3. At Odds, 1981–1984 
In the early 1980s, as we shall see, not all grassroots activists were 
convinced of the utility of Willke’s claims about judicial activism. In the 
fall of 1981, in the aftermath of the confirmation, antiabortion leaders 
believed that it would be more effective to restructure the courts than it 
would be to try to change the interpretive method most judges employed or 
to focus on the issue of judicial nominations. In September 1981, at a 
Religious Right convention, Phyllis Schlafly instead argued for the 
abolition of lifetime tenure for federal judges.141 In November, Weyrich’s 
Free Congress Foundation put out a book entitled A Blueprint for Judicial 
Reform, a volume partly focused on proposals to strip the federal courts of 
jurisdiction.142 That fall, as many as thirty jurisdiction-stripping bills were 
circulating in Congress.143  
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Another option was the ratification of a human life amendment. Indeed, 
Orrin Hatch presented his proposed amendment as a solution to the kind of 
judicial activism highlighted by the White House.144 In campaigning for the 
proposal, he stressed that the Supreme Court justices had, in Roe, 
“impose[d] their personal standards on 230 million Americans,” mistakenly 
intervening in “moral and social issues.”145 
In spite of a somewhat belated campaign by President Reagan in 
support of the amendment, antiabortion members of Congress could not 
muster the votes to end a filibuster on the proposal that began in September 
1982.146 Some in the movement despised the amendment, since it did not 
announce the personhood of the fetus and made it possible to force 
individual states to deny the humanity of the unborn child.147 Because some 
advocates viewed it as a betrayal of the movement’s guiding philosophy, it 
seemed that the Hatch proposal had cast serious doubt on the connection 
between discouraging judicial activism and banning abortion.  
In the fall of 1981, when the Reagan Justice Department again stressed 
arguments about judicial activism, Administration officials borrowed from 
and modified the antiabortion movement’s political justifications for 
avoiding activist decision-making and overruling Roe. For example, 
beginning in October 1981, Attorney General French Smith gave a series of 
speeches outlining the priorities of the Justice Department.148 Without 
mentioning or defining a jurisprudence of original intent, he explained that 
the Justice Department would “focus upon the doctrines that have led to the 
courts’ activism.”149 He singled out “the right to marry, the right to 
procreate, the right of interstate travel, and the right of sexual privacy that, 
among other things, may have spawned a right, with certain limitations, to 
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have an abortion.”150 While not explicitly condemning any of the Court’s 
decisions on these subjects, he labeled them arbitrary and “constitutionally 
dubious and unwise intrusions upon the legislative domain.”151  
Nevertheless, he put as much emphasis on political reasons for rejecting 
judicial activism. In issuing decisions like Roe, as he explained, the Court 
risked losing its own independence and prestige because of “subjective 
judicial policy-making as opposed to reasoned legal interpretation.”152 Like 
Dr. John Willke, he attributed both antiabortion outrage and the 1980 
election to dismay with decisions like Roe. As he put it: “We believe that 
the groundswell of conservatism evidenced by the 1980 election makes this 
an especially appropriate time to urge upon the courts more principled bases 
[of decision-making] that would diminish judicial activism.”153  
Together, Smith’s speeches and the O’Connor confirmation hearings 
also helped to increase the prominence of judicial activism arguments in 
mainstream antiabortion advocacy. In 1982, Reverend Jerry Falwell of the 
Moral Majority and Richard Viguerie put out books on Roe v. Wade and 
judicial activism, stressing that Roe was “made against the tide of public 
opinion” and had earned “condemnation by large segments of the public as 
well as legal scholars . . . .”154   
The new prominence of activism arguments was even more apparent in 
June 1983, after the Supreme Court decided City of Akron v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health.155 The Court invalidated several abortion 
restrictions introduced by the city of Akron, including a twenty-four hour 
waiting period and an informed consent provision.156 
Instead of simply condemning the morality of the decision or speaking 
out in favor of the personhood of fetuses, antiabortion leaders also 
emphasized the issue of judicial activism. Senator Roger Jepsen, an avowed 
opponent of legal abortion, contended that, in Akron, “the Supreme Court 
[was] completely out of their jurisdiction.”157 Gary Curran, a leading 
member of the American Life Lobby, added: “The Supreme Court thinks 
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they are a super legislature for every city, town, county and state in 
America.”158  
4. Connection Undone? 1984–1985 
In 1984, several political events again made antiabortion activists 
downplay claims about judicial activism, including the consequentialist 
claims created at the grassroots level. As historian Daniel K. Williams has 
shown, in 1984 social conservatives made apparent that abortion was their 
leading issue, not simply one among many.159 In trying to win back the 
disillusioned Religious Right, Reagan adopted the more overtly moral 
arguments that the movement had publicized in the 1970s. As part of his 
effort to solidify support among social conservatives, Reagan even 
published a book in 1984, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation.160 
The book did restate judicial activism arguments against Roe, contending 
“abortion-on-demand is not a right granted by the Constitution” and calling 
Roe an act of “raw judicial power.”161 Much of the book focused, however, 
on moral and medical claims: arguments that “[m]odern medicine treats the 
unborn child as a patient” or that “[w]e cannot diminish the value of one 
category of human life—the unborn—without diminishing the value of all 
human life.”162  
For their part, advocates on both sides of the debate primarily addressed 
a prominent film, Silent Scream.163 The film was narrated  by one of the 
most controversial antiabortion activists, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a man 
who had once been a leading member of the abortion rights movement and 
a founding member of NARAL (originally the National Association for the 
Repeal of Abortion Laws and, later, the National Abortion Rights Action 
League).164 Narrated by Nathanson, the film depicted the abortion of a 
twelve-week-old fetus.165 The film energized the movement, which spent 
millions of dollars to screen the film on television news programs and in 
schools.166 In a January 1985 conversation with Nellie Gray of March for 
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Life, Reagan expressed hope that that the film would sway Congress to pass 
legislation limiting abortion.167  
The film prompted a strong response from the abortion rights 
movement, one framed in the same moral terms used by the opposition. In 
1985, NARAL began a campaign entitled “Abortion Rights: Silent No 
More,” in which the group rounded up 40,000 letters from Americans who 
had benefited from the availability of legal abortion.168 In August 1985, 
Planned Parenthood planned to spend approximately $900,000 on 
newspaper and magazine ads in support of the campaign, showing the faces 
and names of women who had had abortions.169  
By the summer of 1985, the abortion debate had shifted again, raising 
interest in the issue of judicial activism. By June 1985, Douglas Johnson of 
the NRLC concluded that there would not likely be a dramatic change in 
Congress leading to passage of legislation that would overrule Roe.170 The 
best strategy for the antiabortion movement was to abandon the doomed 
human life amendment and take up a more productive project. Johnson 
predicted a new focal point for debate: “The president has said he believes 
[Roe v. Wade was] unconstitutional and we expect his nominees to reflect 
that.”171  
As leading studies suggest, Edwin Meese, Reagan’s second Attorney 
General, also brought new attention to the issues of judicial activism and 
originalism.172 By the summer of 1985, Meese began a campaign to reach 
the broader legal community, an effort he launched with a July speech 
before the American Bar Association.173 The July speech was considerably 
more detailed than the Administration’s previous analyses of judicial 
philosophy. Under French Smith, the Justice Department had primarily 
condemned “legislating from the bench” without fully explaining what 
restrained judges would do.174 By contrast, in the July speech, Meese 
endorsed an “endeavor to resurrect the original meaning of [the 
Constitution] . . . .”175 He urged courts to focus on discerning the motives of 
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the Constitution’s framers and, if necessary, looking to the history and 
context of particular constitutional provisions.176  
He also borrowed heavily from the political justifications for overruling 
Roe that the antiabortion movement had created in the early 1980s.177 As 
Meese presented them, however, these were arguments not just for undoing 
Roe but also for adopting originalist interpretive methods.178 The Court’s 
decisions, like Roe, had generated controversy and popular anger, 
producing “intense feelings” on subjects about which “the public [was] 
widely divided.”179 As he argued, originalism would allow the Court to 
avoid “the charge of being either too conservative or too liberal.”180  
At the same time, in the mid-1980s, consequence-based claims slowly 
began to feature in the work of originalist scholars. For example, in 1985, in 
discussing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dred Scott, Graglia mentioned 
the social and political impact of this decision: “Preventing political 
settlement . . . and apparently making the Civil War inevitable. . . .”181 He 
also made clear that “[t]he consequences of that decision . . . must weigh 
heavily in any overall assessment [of it].”182 For the most part, however, in 
1987, when Robert Bork was nominated to the Supreme Court, 
consequentialist arguments against Roe or for originalism had not become 
prominent in the academy or in the courts.183 As we have seen, many 
antiabortion activists were not yet convinced of the relevance of the issue of 
judicial activism to their cause.  
By the end of Bork’s confirmation hearings, as we shall see, members 
of the Grassroots Right had begun to emphasize the issue of judicial 
activism to a much greater extent, convinced as they were that originalism 
would lead to the undoing of Roe. In turn, by the early 1990s, to a greater 
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extent, scholars and jurists had begun to stress the consequence-based 
claims developed at the grassroots level. 
5. The Meaning of Robert Bork 
By 1987, Robert Bork had become the best known judicial and 
academic defender of originalism, as well as an outspoken critic of Roe v. 
Wade, primarily citing his opposition to substantive due process.184 In 
introducing Bork to the American public in July 1987, the Reagan 
Administration—led by Chief of Staff Jim Baker—wanted to downplay 
Bork’s views on Roe and present him as an apolitical figure. For example, a 
talking points memorandum issued by the White House framed the issue as 
“whether the judges and the courts are called upon . . . to interpret the    
laws . . . . or whether judges and the courts should write orders and opinions 
which are, in effect, new laws—the ‘activist’ view.”185 Since 1986, the 
Administration had been concerned about what one Reagan aide described 
as “opposition efforts to position the federal courts as ‘the tool of the far 
right’ under Reagan.”186 In September 1987, the Administration responded 
that “[i]deology should have no role” in Bork’s hearings.187 The only 
interest groups shaping the process, the Administration suggested, were 
those opposed to Bork—what the Administration called “individuals and 
groups who have long demonstrated [that] they are outside the American 
political mainstream.”188 
It was abortion rights groups that fought back most effectively against 
this portrayal of Bork. At the head of these efforts was an alliance of left-
wing advocacy groups known as the Block Bork Coalition.189 The 
organization was formed by the groups that had previously comprised 
Ralph Neas’s Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, a union of labor, 
civil-rights, women’s-rights, disability-rights, and elderly-rights groups, and 
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Nan Aron’s Alliance for Justice, a smaller collection of groups that 
specialized in judicial nominations and in litigation.190 
After conducting extensive focus group research, in August 1987 the 
Coalition developed “themes” and “talking points” memos that offered the 
broad outlines of a strategy to defeat Bork. The August “Themes Memo” 
contended that, if Bork succeeded, particular political results would be 
guaranteed.191 He would “provide the decisive vote to turn back the clock 
for a number of decisions,” including those on abortion.192 As the Coalition 
described it, the current Supreme Court was relatively apolitical, and most 
citizens “accept[ed] and want[ed] to put behind them rulings on issues like 
abortion.”193 A political crusader, Bork would introduce change and 
instability into the law. 
As we shall see, Bork helped to confirm the view of him presented by 
both the antiabortion and abortion rights movements. In his opening 
statements before Congress, Bork insisted that he had a healthy respect for 
precedent, especially because judging required more circumspection than 
did life in the legal academy.194 When pressed on his views about Roe, 
however, Bork described the privacy decisions leading to it as “utterly 
inadequate.”195 He deemed Roe itself to be a decision “contain[ing] almost 
no legal reasoning.”196 Under questioning, he admitted to thinking that Roe 
had been wrongly decided but proposed that the opinion might be “so 
deeply embedded” in the precedent and practice of the country that it could 
not be overturned.197  
To many antiabortion activists, the Bork confirmation hearings made 
clear that originalism did produce desirable results: Bork himself had 
suggested that an originalist Court would not have created Roe v. Wade.198 
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In time, as will become clear, these activists argued not only against Roe 
but also for originalism. In turn, consequence-based arguments against Roe 
seemed more salient to the originalist scholars, jurists, and sympathizers 
dismayed by the tenor and outcome of Bork’s nomination hearings.  
Consequence-based arguments figured centrally in originalist 
scholarship and jurisprudence in the aftermath of the Bork hearings. In 
1990, Bork himself took up these claims. He attributed antiabortion 
“demonstrations, marches, television advertisements, and mass mailings” to 
the Roe Court’s activism.199 Because the Court had not relied on 
constitutional text or history, as Bork portrayed it, the Roe Court was 
“perceived, correctly, as political.”200 He described a threat to the Supreme 
Court’s legitimacy and “integrity” that was no longer abstract but evident in 
social and political changes.201 
A similar argument featured in Justice Scalia’s 1992 dissent in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,202 the opinion in which 
a divided Supreme Court preserved but narrowed Roe.203 Like the Casey 
majority, Scalia focused on the “political pressure” that Roe had 
produced.204 However, Scalia urged the Court to pay “more attention to the 
cause” of the unrest.205 In Scalia’s view, that cause was a “mode of 
constitutional adjudication that relies not upon text and traditional practice 
to determine the law, but upon what the Court calls ‘reasoned judgment,’ 
which turns out to be nothing but philosophical predilection . . . .”206   
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What were the consequences of the Roe Court’s activism? Here again, 
Scalia echoed the arguments honed by activists like Willke: “[B]y 
foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue arouses, by 
banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even 
the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, . . .  the 
Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish.”207 Like Willke, Scalia 
offered an account of the social and political consequences of Roe.208 
Moreover, like Willke, he presented the impact of the decision as a reason 
to undo it.209  
Following the decision of Casey, scholars adopted arguments similar to 
Scalia’s.210 Scalia himself made such arguments a centerpiece of his dissent 
in Stenberg v. Carhart, a decision striking down federal bans on partial-
birth abortion.211 Scalia invoked the political and social consequences of 
both Roe and Casey. In his view, Roe “fanned into life an issue that has 
inflamed our national politics in general, and has obscured with its smoke 
the selection of Justices to this Court in particular . . . .”212 Casey, too, in 
Scalia’s words would lead to “the perpetuation of that disruption . . . .”213 In 
the end, as Scalia presented it, this political turmoil was an argument for 
decision-making based on “constitutional text [or] accepted              
tradition . . . .”214 The consequences of activism were a powerful argument 
for originalism, at least if the Court was interested in “its own    
preservation . . . .”215 
Consequence-based arguments against Roe and for originalism have 
become so prominent that many defending non-originalist interpretive 
methods have had to explain the impact of their own approaches.216 For 
example, in setting out a minimalist approach to constitutional 
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interpretation, Cass Sunstein argues that the consequences highlighted by 
Bork and Scalia emerged not because of a failure to adopt originalist 
methods but because the Court decided too much too soon.217 Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg has argued that the consequences Scalia describes occurred 
because the Court did not offer an adequately convincing constitutional 
rationale for abortion rights, especially one based on sex equality.218  
Consequence-based arguments against Roe have become a central part 
of debate about the decision and about the best methods of constitutional 
interpretation. To a greater extent than is acknowledged in prior studies, 
many grassroots activists and social-movement members created important 
popular claims about judicial activism, claims that have become a 
meaningful part of first-generation originalist scholarship and 
jurisprudence. 
C. Rethinking the Politics of Originalism 
What more can the history considered here tell us about the politics of 
originalism? As we have seen, the appeal of originalism figures in studies 
on popular constitutionalism.219 It is at the center of discussion about the 
jurisprudential merits of originalism.220 Other studies look at the attraction 
of originalism in assessing why and how an interpretive method sustains 
public interest.221 A common question runs through these debates: How do 
judges, professors, and politicians successfully popularize a judicial 
philosophy? 
Scholars like Siegel and Greene envision the popularization of 
originalism as a dialogic process, in which elites and grassroots both 
participate.222 Nevertheless, scholars analyzing the attraction of originalism 
often focus on the elites’ role in creating or explaining originalism and its 
justifications.223 If we change the focal point of our analysis, we can better 
appreciate the importance of studying what kinds of exchanges have 
produced a politically successful judicial philosophy. As was the case with 
crucial arguments for overruling Roe, grassroots activists and social-
movement members may well have played a central role in reshaping, 
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creating, or reinterpreting judicial activism claims that play an important 
part in justifying originalism.  
As importantly, by stressing the role of elite actors, current scholarship 
has often assumed that the justifications for originalism offered by lay 
activists and government officials are one and the same. Indeed, grassroots 
advocates formulated and popularized their own definitions of judicial 
activism and judicial restraint. 
1. Judicial Activism and the Radicals 
One powerful example of this mode of reinterpretation can be seen in 
the claims made by the direct-action branch of the antiabortion movement 
in the 1980s. The radical wing of the movement was diverse and complex, 
especially by the late 1980s. For example, in 1981, Father Paul Marx 
founded one direct-action protest organization, Human Life International, in 
Gaithersburg, Maryland, focusing on clinic protests, while Mark Crutcher’s 
Life Dynamics sought to harass abortion providers by tying up their phone 
lines and suing for malpractice.224 Moreover, the line between the direct-
action organizations and the older, generally more moderate groups was 
fluid. The American Life League, a mainstream conservative Catholic 
group, supported Operation Rescue, a direct-action protest unit, and 
adopted tactics similar to those of the Pro-Life Action League, another 
similar group.225  
Operation Rescue and the Pro-Life Action League were the largest and 
most influential direct-action protest groups.226 Although these 
organizations did not explicitly mention originalism or define restrained 
judging, they heavily emphasized the issue of judicial activism.227 
Moreover, as this Article contends, these organizations also pioneered 
important claims on the subject. 
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The most influential such group early in the 1980s, the Pro-Life Action 
League, was sustained largely because of the efforts of Joseph Scheidler.228 
Born in Indiana to a prominent Roman Catholic family, Scheidler attended 
the University of Notre Dame, became a journalist, considered but 
ultimately decided not to join a Catholic religious order, and began teaching 
at journalism school.229 In 1974, he convinced the Illinois branch of the 
NRLC to hire him as director.230 In 1978, after he publicized a protest at the 
Concord Clinic in Chicago, he lost his job at Illinois Right to Life, but he 
and his remaining supporters within the group, including former Quaker 
Oats Vice President Tom Roeser, formed a new organization, Friends for 
Life (“FFL”).231 FFL established its reputation as the most radical 
organization of its kind—the “Green Berets of the right-to-life movement,” 
in the words of columnist Patrick Buchanan.232 In 1980, after a bitter 
internal battle, Scheidler left FFL, founding the Pro-Life Action League 
(“PLAL”) with his wife and one close ally.233 
Scheidler began publicizing claims about judicial activism in 1984, 
when he was building Pro-Life Action Network (“PLAN”), a network of 
direct-action protestors.234 At a Fort Lauderdale, Florida, meeting that 
attracted 600 activists, Scheidler relied on the illegality of Roe and on the 
existence of a more important moral law in justifying his own tactics and 
those of his supporters.235 However, Scheidler used his arguments against 
judicial activism in favor of the kind of natural law reasoning rejected by 
many first-generation originalists.236 As he explained in the New York Times 
in December 1984: “I consider sit-ins obedience to a higher law. I’ll stay 
after I’m told to leave as an act of desperation because I’m trying to save a 
life.”237 
Scheidler’s fame grew in 1985 when he published Closed: 99 Ways to 
Stop Abortion, a strategy manual for clinic protestors.238 That year, in 
responding to an increase in clinic bombings and other abortion-related 
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violence, Scheidler reiterated his claims about judicial activism and said he 
“neither condone[d] nor encourage[d] violence . . . . While perpetrators of 
vandalism must be willing to accept the consequences of their act, in a real 
sense their actions may be more than an option.  For many, these actions 
constitute a moral obligation.”239  
As Scheidler became more prominent, he brought more attention to his 
claims about judicial tyranny in Roe. Moreover, as he explained to the 
Chicago Tribune in 1985, the Supreme Court had no authority “to force a 
[moral] view” on the public.240 The only consequence of this raw judicial 
power was obvious: the Court had “engender[ed] disrespect for the          
law . . . .”241 
Scheidler did echo some of the conventional claims made by first-
generation originalists. But as we have seen, he also infused conventional 
judicial activism arguments with religious and natural law principles. These 
claims reworked and refracted conventional arguments against judicial 
activism. 
An organization similar to Scheidler’s, Operation Rescue, became the 
most prominent such group in the late 1980s.242 At the beginning, Operation 
Rescue was the brainchild of Randall Terry.243 Like many evangelical 
Protestants of his generation, Terry was first exposed to arguments 
condemning abortion and judicial activism when reading the works of 
Francis Schaeffer.244 A pastor in the Reformed Presbyterian Church, a 
fundamentalist sect, Schaeffer had moved with his family in 1948 to 
L’Abri, Switzerland.245 He began his career in religious publishing in 1976 
with How Shall We Then Live?: The Rise and Decline of Western Thought 
and Culture.246 In 1979, Schaeffer’s son, Frank, made the book into a film 
series.247 Appearing as the narrator of the film, Schaeffer described the 
erosion of American culture that had resulted from the abandonment of 
Biblical principles and the rule of God.248  
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Judicial activism was both a cause and a symptom of secular 
humanism.249 Schaeffer argued that, in decisions like Roe v. Wade, “the 
Constitution of the United States can be made to say what the courts of the 
present want it to say—based a court’s decision as to what the court feels is 
sociologically helpful at the moment.”250 The justification for judicial 
activism—in Schaeffer’s words, the belief that “[l]aw has only a variable 
content”—came directly from man’s disastrous desire to be autonomous 
from God’s revelation.251 
In 1981, in A Christian Manifesto, Schaeffer elaborated on this 
theory.252 There, he identified Roe as a key example of judicial activism.253 
He echoed academic arguments that Roe had no constitutional foundation 
and that the Court had made an essentially political decision that should 
have been left to the elected representatives of the people.254 He also 
asserted that the Roe Court’s activism was ungodly. Roe had made secular 
humanism into a constitutional principle, holding that “[o]ne choice is as 
valid as another.”255 
Influenced by Schaeffer, in 1984 Terry and his wife began protesting 
outside a local provider in Binghamton, New York, eventually leading 
boycotts.256 By 1986, he had made contact with Joseph Scheidler and the 
network of radical organizations he was in the process of building.257 A year 
later, Terry was well on his way to forming Operation Rescue.258  
Operation Rescue specialized in large protests and attracted substantial 
media attention: for example, between 1987 and 1988, 211 protestors were 
arrested in front of a Cherry Hill, New Jersey, clinic, 503 in New York, and 
753 in Atlanta.259 The controversy made Terry himself something of a 
celebrity and brought attention to Terry’s arguments about judicial tyranny. 
In February 1989, for example, when Operation Rescue was sponsoring 
a four-day protest predicted to draw several thousand participants, Reverend 
Randy Aller, an ally of Terry’s, explained: “Abortion is legal, but it’s not 
                                                                                                                           
 
 249  Id. at 142, 176. 
 250  FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, HOW SHOULD WE THEN LIVE?: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF WESTERN 
THOUGHT AND CULTURE 218 (1976). 
 251  Id. 
 252  FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, A CHRISTIAN MANIFESTO (1981). 
 253  Id. at 48–49. 
 254  See id. at 49. 
 255  See, e.g., id. at 47. 
 256  See RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 121, at 249–52. 
 257  Id. at 208. 
 258  See, e.g., id. at 115, 208. 
 259  See, e.g., Anti-Abortion Protestors Close New Jersey Clinics, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1987, at C4; 
Nadine Brozan, 503 Held in Abortion Protest on E. 85th St., N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1988, at B1; Robert Di 
Veroli, Abortion Foes Look to 1960s for Strategy, SAN DIEGO EVENING TRIB., Nov. 16, 1988, at A1. 
2013] Grassroots Originalism 237 
 
lawful—there’s a higher law.”260 In March, while fighting an injunction 
designed to block another protest, another ally echoed Terry’s claims that 
“[n]o judge . . . has the right to make it legal to kill children.”261 Later in 
1989, when Operation Rescue had scheduled ninety protests, Terry and 
several colleagues were arrested for violating state trespass laws.262 Terry 
used the trial as a platform for his arguments about judicial overreaching.263  
In September 1989, when facing a California jury, Terry defended 
himself by condemning Roe.264 In rejecting the Court’s illegitimate 
decision, he had been “[standing] up to . . . tyranny.”265 Condemning Roe 
was compatible with both the Constitution and with biblical principles. As 
he explained to the jury, voting against Roe was not voting for anarchy. It 
was “calling for . . . justice.”266 Like Scheidler, Terry combined 
conventional arguments against judicial activism with natural law claims 
about the natural or divine law. 
Terry, Scheidler, and their organizations meant something very 
different by judicial activism or judicial restraint than did Edwin Meese or 
Robert Bork. In criticizing the sweeping decision of the Roe Court, Terry 
and Scheidler marshaled not only constitutional but also explicitly religious 
and moral arguments. They saw no tension between the two and even 
argued that judges and juries should respect the “higher law.”  
Moreover, concern about the democratic legitimacy of Roe or decisions 
like it was, for Terry and Scheidler, only one issue among many. Each 
activist assumed that the “higher law” always dictated the right answer.267 
In decisions like Roe, the Court could be faulted for ignoring the will of the 
people. However, if “the people” had themselves come up with the wrong 
answer on abortion, Terry and Scheidler would have been no less likely to 
protest. 
These activists make clear that judicial activism arguments used by 
grassroots activists can mean something quite different than the contentions 
that are prominent in the academy. We have mostly missed these rich, 
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alternative understandings because we have assumed that grassroots actors 
simply adopted the claims pioneered by academics and judges. The truth is 
much more complex.  
III. CONCLUSION 
Why has originalism acquired so much popular momentum? In the 
academy, studies have focused on the role of law professors, judges, and 
members of recent Republican presidential administrations.   
The history of consequence-based justifications for overruling Roe 
offers a different perspective on important, legitimacy-based arguments for 
originalism. This history has several important implications. First, this 
Article raises questions about scholarship suggesting that Roe created the 
kind of crisis of legitimacy described by abortion opponents. Social- 
movement members, many of whom were active before Roe, popularized 
claims that the decision created the antiabortion movement and precipitated 
a crisis of judicial legitimacy. We should be careful about assuming the 
historical truth of claims that have so obvious a political and instrumental 
purpose.  
Second, this Article highlights the extent to which important 
justifications for originalism were forged in a dialogue between social-
movement members, elite and grassroots actors. Significantly, lay activists 
added arguments of their own to the discussion. This suggests that ordinary 
citizens are not simply consumers, students, or members of an audience. At 
least in the abortion context, they are also contributors and creators.  This 
Article shows that too little is known about how grassroots actors 
understand and deploy the rhetoric of judicial restraint. To the extent that 
the history considered here is an example, lay advocates have been more 
influential, active, and inventive in this process than is currently thought. 
Finally, studies asking how any judicial philosophy gains political 
currency may have obscured the history of important justifications for 
originalism and important arguments about judicial legitimacy. If we focus 
primarily on the ways that the elites inspire, educate, and mobilize citizens 
behind any interpretive method, we might miss important contributions 
made by grassroots actors. How will the politics of originalism evolve? In 
answering these questions, we would be wrong to deemphasize the role 
played by grassroots activists. As in the past, their influence may be hard to 
ignore. 
 
 
 
